# 1AC

#### This year presents a continuing chapter in the humanism legacy. The hero figures of capitalism cannot be divorced from the history of antitrust. This archetype is the cultivation of phase-shifts strewn through the history of Anthropos.

#### *Man1[[1]](#footnote-1)* cloaks itself in the veil of theologia. This is the division between spirit/flesh, "good" and "evil" where the "pure" clerical ethnoclass became elevated over their "heretical" counterparts who "lack a taste for the divine". This text stood at the beginning foundations for the "holy" crusades, and colonial "civilizing missions".

#### Man 2 organized "Man" through the advent of biological readings of the body- Darwinian readings of "fitness" were subsumed at the new center of the European rational subject. They appeared at the height of "genetic selection". This genetic hierarchy left black and indigenous folk in the undesirable categories- cast as scum at the bottom of the political system.

#### These iterations of men cultivate in the "hero figure" – going by the name of *homo oeconomicus.* This hero figure has been saturated by the previous iterations of man and seeps into this year’s resolution. The Hero Figure of *homo oeconomicus* are the prime wielders of the capitalist state. They are white, male, Christian, economically stable who utilize the capitalist state for wealth accumulation.

#### Antitrust is the final iteration of homo oeconomicus. It reverts the market back to its origin form with pure and unfaltering competition. This reversion is the prime state of the market where in homo oeconomicus have no excuse not to become part of the market because we have economic freedom. Antitrust rewrites the code of human life. Now, capital is the new blood that gives life to mere bodies

McKittrick 2015 (Katherine McKittrick – Professor in Gender Studies and the Graduate Program in Cultural Studies, Black Studies, Cultural Geographies, The Arts (music, fiction, poetry, visual art), Theories of Race, and Interdisciplinarity at University of Queens. “Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as a Praxis”, Duke University Press, pp. 9-10 [starting at “This conversation should be read with Wynter’s …” to “lives of all humans are increasingly subordinated to a figure that thrives on accumulation.”] – ERW/BEH)

#### The resolution situates itself within the realm of rationality. The economy is not an ahistorical development, it is development of Darwinism reading of fitness. It assumes prime wielder of reason who can shape the economic sphere in their own vision.

Hantel 20 (Max Hantel- Assistant professor of Women’s and Gender studies at Rutgers University, *“Placisity and Fungibility On Sylvia Wynter’s Pieza Framework”,* Duke University Press, PP. 111-113). file:///C:/Users/peter/Dropbox/My%20PC%20(DESKTOP-DB7FRFG)/Downloads/Plasticity\_and\_Fungibility\_On\_Sylvia\_Wyn.pdf

In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault describes the movement from classical liberal economics to neoliberal economics in postwar Europe and the shift to a US-led consensus. The development of **homo economicus** recalibrates the population biopolitics of the nineteenth and early twentieth century around the individual as economic actor who defines **(evolutionary)** success in terms of efficient optimization and material accumulation. The new political rationality Foucault describes goes beyond a set of economic reforms and instantiates a new triangulation of the economy, the state, and its citizens. As Wendy Brown summarizes the mutation, “Neoliberalism does not conceive of either the market itself or rational economic behavior as purely **natural.** Both are constructed—organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention and **orchestration.**”50 Free subjects of classical economics demand only the negative freedom of nonintervention to successfully pursue their naturally occurring greed; the aggregate of individuals left alone in such a way achieves the optimal conditions of the invisible hand of the market. Neoliberal politics traffics in much of the same language of classical economics but sees a properly **entrepreneurial** citizen-**subject** **as something to be fostered across all spheres of human activity,** such that traditional divisions between economic and noneconomic aspects of life dissolve. **Homo economicus,** the neoliberal subject par excellence, **brings economic optimization to bear on everything from sex and kinship to recreation and exercise through tactics of marginal efficiency gain consistently inscribed across discursive formations of subjunctivization,** including the family, psychology, criminal justice, the classroom, and the university, along with new developments in digital technology and social media. These tactics all intertwine through strategic material accumulation above all else. **The state serves as** but **one more economic actor**, leaving self-regulation as fostered by different spheres of neoliberal subjunctivization to citizens **rendered as entrepreneurs of consumption.** That is, **they accumulate wealth in** the register of **tactical consumption that further** optimizes their good moral **standing as economic successes.** In Wynter’s terms, material accumulation becomes the crucial measure of one’s humanity under the conditions of Man2. One way of describing this interface of accumulation and measurement is what Gilles Deleuze calls the development of the “control society,” in which the individual of classical liberalism is disaggregated and recomposed as a “dividual.”51 The dividual emerges from manifold statistical tools for capturing the body’s capacities and predictively shaping the translation of the virtual into the actual. **One cannot formally describe the dividual in the abstract because it is a precise data point across all its measurable connections to demographic ranges, with specific intersections of data streams given political meanings at different moments.** One can certainly imagine, however, a decidualized subject composition emerging from various measurements: spatial mobilities, monetary transactions, medical risk profiles, education background, earning potential, quantitative ideological beliefs, security challenges—the list could go on indefinitely, and indeed, the dream of control society is exactly to make such a list endlessly flexible and totalizing such that no aspect of escapes capture. This phase of **capitalism is “no longer directed toward production but toward products**, that is, toward sales or markets.”52 What I want to suggest is that the historical development Deleuze describes is best understood in relationship to Wynter’s parallel elaboration of the pieza framework and its refiguration from the enslaved body to the laboring body to the consuming body. The control society’s simultaneous creation and targeting of the dividual, based on a shift from production to products, is most intimately associated with the creation of market profiles based on the quantification of every aspect of life and its monetization (that is, identifying virtual sources of profit and inventing concepts and technologies that actualize the movement of capital). It is, in other words, **a subjectivization** primarily through consumption, **recasting other functions of sovereign governance** like social welfare or security and policing through the metrics of privatization and optimal choice. Hence, Deleuze acknowledges but leaves tellingly unanalyzed the uneven geographies of control, cautioning against an overgeneralization of the dividual as a mode of subjunctivization or a clean narrative of progression from sovereign power and biopower: “One thing, it’s true, hasn’t changed—capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos.”53 **To route this challenge through Wynter’s work, the question is how to link the** emergence of control societies as a **specific technology of Man2** (reifying and **targeting populations considered human under neoliberal regimes** of accumulation) to the great majority of the world systematically negated by their lack of a relevant market profile. **As Doreen Massey puts it** in her study of refugees, the working class, and urban slums, “At one level they have been tremendous co**ntributors to what we call time-space compression; and at another level they are imprisoned by it.**”54 Deploying Wynter’s pieza framework here recasts the consumer, structurally parallel to the figure of the dividual, **as the source of extractive value under neoliberal capitalism in a manner contingent on the earlier production of the enslaved body and so always already racialized in the global sense of Man2, but not reducible to race alone.**

#### Competition has become the bar in which people obtain their right to life. Competition law is a regulator of interpersonal behavior and maximizing the potential profit to obtain the “good life”. Welcome to the world of the liberal market- we are given life and given death by market.

Turmus 11 (Ezgi Turmus, professor of social sciences at Istanbul University Social Sciences Institute Social Structure Social Change Department, Law of Competition Effect on Enterprise Freedom: Vertical Switches in Turkey)

Law is a set of rules that contain the power of state authority behind it. The individuals who make up the society have their **rights superior to themselves for the need for protection.** It has paved the way for the institutionalization of justice by transferring it to an **authority.** Other Like institutions, the legal institution is “ stable (but not stable) for human interaction. It reduces uncertainty by establishing a structure (which is not necessarily efficient). ” 15 As a social institution, law regulates the order of society within the framework of certain rules. It exists to provide justice and to meet the need for justice, and there is **social interaction.** shows its presence everywhere. Competition, which spreads to all areas of social life, is within the scope of law. In order for people to reach their intended position in the order in which they live, and It can be considered as a right to freely obtain the tools that it can be used for A person is to reveal his full potential while using his own abilities and to do this. has the right to develop by competing with the potentials of other individuals. 16 This is the **competition** In this sense, it **is directly related to the right to life of the person** and is considered as a right. should be identifiable. The emergence of competition as a branch of law really **took place in the USA in 1890.** with the Sherman law. But before that, the first It is stated that the laws were seen in Babylon 4000 years ago. 17 Also Old In Greece and India, BC. 50 years of laws regulating competition and the first law against monopolies in the modern sense was enacted in England in 1624. It is the Statute of Monopoly. 18 The USA lost the legal and economic independence of businesses and It is the country where the trust structure, under which they continue their production, first emerged. The effect of the trusts in the country was later changed by the antitrust laws in another way. In other words, it gave rise to Sherman's Law. generally monopolies, collusion, which are in the regulatory field of competition law. and mergers constitute the main focal points of the administrative authority in the law-making process. they form. In the emergence of all these as a branch of law, legitimacy, restricting or limiting the rights of others due to its destructive properties. Free market mechanism to provide the **highest level of welfare must maintain its competitive environment. But the free market mechanism** must also operate in a way that may weaken the competitive process **and in this case a protection mechanism is needed.** This shield of protection ensures that competition is legally enforced. can be achieved through regulation. 19 According to Adam Smith, free on the market There may be some situations that prevent the emergence of competitive price. Of these most importantly, **between enterprises (are) regulated by competition law. is cooperation.** This is why Smith favors the total liberation of enterprises. and emphasizes the need for the state to undertake a task in this regard. Hence Smith's views are important in the process leading up to today's competition law. can be said. property, inheritance, work and rights such as freedom of contract, freedom to establish private enterprise, right to competition is sending. In addition, in Article 167 of the Constitution, “The state ensures that money, credit, capital, goods and services markets are healthy and orderly. takes measures to ensure and improve its functioning; actual and contractual results in the markets It prevents the monopolization and cartelization that will arise ” 21 , this prevention will be used in the future. with the law-making process, which will determine the limits and rules of its activity. has resulted. In short, this clear duty given to the state in the constitution is competitive today. to embod(ies) itself through the regulation of law. Competition law does not directly **protect the interests of individuals.** concerned with the public interest. The state has this duty, which is also stated in the constitution. using it on the basis of its own sovereignty and thus maintaining public order. aims to. In this sense, competition law both in terms of its purpose and seems closer to public law in terms of the tools it uses. 22 The regulation area of ​​competition law is the public interest we mentioned above. due to its purpose, from unfair competition, which is the regulation of Turkish Commercial Law. are separated. Because unfair competition regulation, unfair competition between traders (and) tasks such as preventing behavior, protecting the trader against malicious activities and these falls(s)within the scope of interpersonal law. 2

#### The continual interaction with the market has been framed as a route to liberation. As Sylvia Wynter Reminds us “No longer be a native but come and be Man like us! Become homo oeconomicus! While the only way we could, they further told us, become un- underdeveloped, was by following the plans of both their and our economists.” This reiterates the liberal narrative of calculative rationality.

**Winnubst 19**, Chair and Professor of Women’s, Gender & Sexuality Studies at Ohio State University. (Shannon, 12-15-2019, “The many lives of fungibility: anti-blackness in neoliberal times”, *Journal of Gender Studies*, pg. 108-109, DOI: 10.1080/09589236.2019.1692193) Thanks Azja and Graham

From the perspective of the anti-black ontology that frames liberalism, modernity and global capitalism, this attachment of economic abstraction to the projects of self-making is already a racializing phenomenon. From a strictly ontological perspective, **only white bodies** and **lives** have been granted **proprietary access** to the **freedoms of the market** that are exacerbating into **subjective mechanisms in neoliberalism**. **Violently abstracted** into **commodities** and **capital from the outset**, black bodies are positioned **ontologically** as **external** to the **market rationalities** that **intensify in the neoliberal episteme**: black bodies remain **objects**, not **subjects**, of the **market** and its **calculations**. Despite the **rhetoric of colour-blindness** and the logic of **equivocation** between social differences that would erase it, this **ontological iteration of fungibility** as the **foundational** violence of antiblackness **remains intact** in the neoliberal episteme. Consequently, as the modes of subjectivity transform from the classically liberal model of rights-bearing interiority into maximizing circuits-of-interests, the foundational violence of anti-blackness persists, even as the abstraction from its historical markers intensifies. These processes of internalizing neoliberal fungibility as a mechanism of subjectivity are, therefore, already racialized – that is, they track and signify differently according to different racialized situatedness in the colonial ontology of anti-blackness.

Returning to Foucault’s accounts of neoliberalism as the birth-site of biopolitics, I expand on this reading of **biopolitical normalization** that is rooted precisely in this **abstraction of** the **market rationality**. In Sleights of Reason, Mary Beth Mader argues that the unique epistemology of biopolitical normalization is not the gradual homogenization of cultural forms and values around particular nodes (medical, legal, familial, sexual, and so on), but the **ascendancy** of a **numerical standardization** of objects. More incisively, Mader isolates the specific logic of biopolitical normalization in the immanently self-referential work of a statistical norm, wherein the logic of the ratio **locks** the abstraction performed by numbers into a **self-enclosed system of referentiality**. The exemplar of this, for Mader, is the use of suicide rates: ‘the expression suicide rates no longer refers to any **person** or **persons** but to a relation between **numbers** and **quantities alone**’ (Mader, 2012, p. 56). This **sealing of referentiality** from any object or phenomenon beyond the numerical **intensifies the abstraction** already enacted by the numerical form into an enclosed system of meaning. The move from individual to rate, that is, further abstracts the issue at hand (for example, suicide) by way of a group of comparison. Social comparison thereby becomes the horizon for meaning-making.6 Rendered through the numerical form, this self-enclosed system of signification is constituted by the mathematical continuity inherent in the quantifying methods of gradation endemic to statistical analysis: it holds no referent external to the numerical form.

Through Mader’s trenchant analysis of this numerical standardization of the object as central to the unique form of biopolitical normalization, I extrapolate one step further to argue that it is also a crucially new social metric of the neoliberal episteme and its transformations of our social rationalities and practices. With social comparability provided by **statistical ratios** as a **primary lexicon** for meaning-making, we are all encouraged to **thrive** in the **endless calculations** of **maximizing** and **enhancing** afforded by this **numerical** **metric** (which is, **appropriately**, [colour-neutral] ~~colour-blind~~). Bouncing among these endlessly proliferating comparative devices, we neoliberals (stripped of meaningful social difference) are at home in a socio-psychic space that is forever aspirational and driven by many, many markets, styles, media, and trends. Neoliberal subjects internalize this calculative rationality as the perfect metric for endless self-stimulation and enhancement: it maximizes interests efficiently.

Gradually expanding across this neoliberal episteme, this economic epistemology increasingly functions as the most fitting rationality for all kinds of evaluations. We are, living in these strained neoliberal times, thereby losing hesitation about expanding the reach of this calculative rationality beyond particular kinds of objects, phenomena, and relations. The **neoliberal internalization** of the **calculative rationality** **endemic** to the economic market leads to a **transformation** in our evaluations of **all social values**. Whether the issue is **suicide rates**, **racism** or the kind of **coffee** that is ‘on-trend’, **social values begin to be determined** through the **single barometer** of this **calculative rationality** **abstracted from** and **extracted out of** any historico-social context.

This expansion of this **calculative rationality**, which functions as a social and subjective rationality in neoliberalism, intensifies the various mechanisms of liberalism, **modernity**, and global capitalism – as well as the **expansionist impulse of colonialism**. For example, it **lies at the core of the reduction of humans to cargo** that Spillers so clearly elaborates. More specifically, the **expansion** and **intensification** of this **calculative, economic epistemology** into a social and subjective rationality **transforms** the abstraction that is inherent to white European-American positions in the **anti-black colonial ontology** of liberalism, modernity, and global **capitalism**. It transforms, that is, the abstraction from the founding material violence that facilitates centuries of systemic exploitation. In order to examine this neoliberal transformation of that abstraction more precisely, I have isolated one register of it: the fresh itineraries of fungibility.

**Why answer to the summoning's of neoliberal capitalism when we can study Man2. Why accept the resolution's entrenchment of the resolution's neuro economic subject- enveloped in production and ethno-specific survival- when we can when we can warp that fantasy, opting to “[project] ourselves into an un-human future”[[2]](#footnote-2)?**

**Every expansion of Man’s order correlates with the pulverization of “aberrant” non-humans – black and indigenous life. If the topic extends Man’s sovereign scepter into everyday interaction, then what does that mean for us?**

**Voting affirmative situates habeas viscus as a refusal of the resolution’s sanctification of Man. This is a radically materialist research model that de-synchs from the rez’s humanist aspirations, tuning into liminal vibrations that contest what the econus in homo-economus is all about.**

**Weheliye 14**(Alexander G. Weheliye - professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, Habeas Viscus: Racialized Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, pg. 135 – ERW)

Because black cultures have **frequently not had access** to **Man’s language**, **world**, **future**, or **humanity**, black studies has **developed a set of assemblages** through which to **perceive** and **understand a world** in which **subjection** is **but one path to humanity**, neither its exception nor its idealized sole fea­ture. Yet black studies, if it is to **remain critical** and **oppositional**, **cannot fall** prey to **juridical humanity** and its **concomitant pitfalls**, since this **only affects change** in the **domain of the map** but **not the territory**. In order to do so, the **hieroglyphics of the flesh** should not be **conceptualized** as just **excep­tional** or **radically particular**, since this **habitually leads** to the **comparative tabulation** of **different systems** of **oppression** that then **serve as the basis** for **defining personhood as possession**. As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, **humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species** for the **benefit of other humans**, which at the same time **yields a surplus ver­sion** of the human: **Man**. **Man** represents the **western configuration** of the **human** as **synonymous** with the **heteromasculine**, **white**, **propertied**, and **liberal subject** that **renders** all those who **do not conform** to these character­istics as **exploitable nonhumans**, literal **legal nobodies**. If we are to **affect significant systemic changes**, then we **must locate** at least some of the **strug­gles for justice** in the **region of humanity** as a **relational ontological totality** (an **object of knowledge**) that **cannot be reduced** to either the **universal** or **particular**. According to Wynter, this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation from the psychic dictates of our present... genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon ... all non-white peoples, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of beingf] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The **level of the map encompasses** the **nominal inclusion** of **nonwhite subjects** in the **false universality** of **western humanity** in the wake of **radical movements** of the 1960s, while the **territory** Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the **figure of Man** as a **racializing assemblage**. Wielding this **very particular** and **historically malleable classification** is not an **uncritical reiteration** of the **humanist episteme** or an **insistence on the exceptional particularity** of **black humanity**. Rather, **Afro-diasporic cultures** provide **singular**, **mutable**, and **contingent** figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The **problematic** of **humanity** however, **needs to be highlighted** as **one of the prime objects** of **knowledge** of black studies, since **not doing so** will **sustain the structures**, **discourses**, and **institutions** that **detain black life** and **thought** within the **strictures of particularity** so as to **facilitate** the **violent conflation of Man** and the **human**. Otherwise, the **general theory** of how humanity has been **lived**, **conceptualized**, **shrieked**, **hungered into being**, and **imagined** by those subjects **violently barred** from this **domain** and touched by the **hieroglyphics** of the **flesh** will **sink back** into the **deafening ocean** of **prelinguistic particularity**. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is **engaged in engendering forms** of the **human vital** to **understanding** not only **black cultures** but **past**, **present**, and **future humanities**. As a **demonic island**, black studies **lifts the fog** that **shrouds the laws of comparison**, **particularity**, and **exception** to **reveal an aquatic outlook** “far away from **the continent of man**.”30 The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson’s apt phrasing, “the **continuing development** of a **collective consciousness** informed by the **historical struggles for liberation** and motivated by the **shared sense of obligation** to preserve [and I would add also to **reimagine**] the **collective being**, the **ontological totality**.”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus **defies domestication** both on the basis of **particularized personhood** as a result of **suffering**, as in **human rights discourse**, and on the grounds of the **universalized version** of **western Man**. Rather, **habeas viscus** points to the **terrain of humanity** as a **relational assemblage** exterior to the **jurisdiction of law** given that the law can **bequeath** or **rescind** **ownership** of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus **diverges** from the **discourses and institutions** that **yoke the flesh** to **political violence** in the **modus** of **deviance**. Instead, it **translates** the **hieroglyphics of the flesh** into a **potentiality** in any and all things, an **originating leap** in the **imagining of future anterior freedoms** and new **genres of humanity**. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails le**aving behind the world of Man** and some of its **attendant humanist pieties**. As opposed to **depositing the flesh outside politics**, the **normal**, the **human**, and so on, we need a **better understanding** of its **varied workings** in order to **disrobe the cloak of Man**, which gives the human a **long-overdue extreme makeover**; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our **new millennium** will be one between the **ongoing imperative of securing** the well-being of our **present ethnoclass** (i.e. western bourgeois) **conception of the human**, **Man**, which **overrepresents itself** as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the **full cognitive** and **behavioral autonomy** of the **human species itself/ourselves**.”32 Claiming and **dwelling in the monstrosity** of the **flesh** present some of the **weapons in the guerrilla warfare** to “**secure the hill cognitive** and **behavioral** autonomy of the **human species**,” since these **liberate from captivity assemblages** of **life**, **thought**, and **politics** from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, **disfigure the centrality of Man** as the **sign for the human**. As an **assemblage of humanity**, habeas viscus **animates the elsewheres of Man** and **emancipates the true potentiality** that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; **assemblages of freedom** that **sway to the temporality** of **new syncopated beginnings** for the human **beyond the world** and **continent of Man**

**Against the proliferation of New Vitruvianism(s), the aff cultivates a moment of non-human diffraction that chafes up against monocultural deifications of the human – this *anti-curricula* situates theoretical inquiry not as a zone of repose, but rather, as a catalyst for lines of flight and quotidian moments of liminal affirmation.**

**Bayley 2018** (Dr. Annouchka Bayley – published several works on Posthumanism, Education and Practice-as-Research pedagogies. In 2014 she won the Warwick Award for Teaching Excellence. “Posthumanism, Decoloniality and Re-Imagining Pedagogy”. *Parallax*, Volume 24, 2018, Issue 3: Posthuman Pedagogies, Guest Edited by Annouchka Bayley and Carol, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2018.1496576> - ERW)

**The dead, white men that created Enlightenment pedagogy now find their posthumous legacy in need of an urgent re-imagining** as ‘[t]he human, social and environmental devastations induced by economic disparities and structural injustices in the access to the benefits of the global economy and its advanced technologies add another layer of violence to the contemporary world.’1 In response to this, how can ‘we’ pedagogues come to glimpse – through a glass darkly, perhaps – ways in which to **diffract ideas** about teaching and learning from across educational sectors that remain response-able to the difficult mission of **reinventing notions of what** (and who) **constitutes the human** in today’s twenty-first century world.2 As Rosi Braidotti suggests: These questions resonate across the field of posthumanities. For instance, posthuman discourses of the digital and environmental humanities, crossed with postcolonial and feminist studies, raise more urgently than ever the question of scale: how can we re-think our interconnection in the era of the Anthropocene, while re-thinking our new ecologies of belonging? The connection to the natural environment and to the technosphere of new media recasts the issue of alterity in non-human terms that cannot be adequately dealt with in the discourses and language of poststructuralist difference, let alone universalist humanism.3 Talking, thinking, moving and feeling with the urgency of Braidotti’s and other scholars’ questionings, I begin to walk in circles in my garden considering what might be involved in the creation of a ‘next step’ in pedagogy, wondering why I cannot seem to get out of this trap – literally in this moment a trap of circularity, bare feet cutting side-down into backyard grasses, marking over and over again a pathway of a borrowed shape. How performative can pedagogy be? **What kinds of runway might be paved in order to take necessary and timely ‘lines of flight’ out of here and towards possible new presents and futures**, towards a truly participatory approach to twenty-first century pedagogy?4 **What can be (un)done in the practice of teaching itself,** to invoke Gayatri Spivak, **that might decentre the circular Vitruvian-ism of our educative heritage?** How might ‘we’ Others, we teachers, we atomic and agentic ‘selves’ diffract our colonial heritages differently through pedagogy? The question is no longer simply an ‘if’ or a ‘why’ but how. Simply HOW? By diffracting this question through myself here, now, my own heritage of performance art momentarily emerges fractally. I have burnt, broken, hung, cut and bled on stage and still been no closer to the performative justice-to-come that my own cultural inheritances have craved (as a feminist Christian-Muslim-Jew in no particular order, diffracting the prism of a material-discursive ‘identity’ endlessly in-flux) to give voice to. But perhaps this act of performing selves, performing memories, performing silent and loud agential Othernesses as I have understood them from moment to moment, has come to inform an approach to teaching and learning that focuses on exactly **who and what gets a voice,** right down to an atomic level. Not just, in fact a voice, but the right to be a teacher, **the right to have one’s own myriad and spectral heritages heard.** The right to responsibly acknowledge that ‘we’ are constituted by multiple, entangled Othernesses, including nonhuman ones that are bred in the bone. Thus, emerges a momentary territorialisation as the fault lines of all my walking questions rumble and mould into shape: **Who and what teaches?** **This kind of approach diffracts the Vitruvian Man out of centre stage,** **and thus with him, diffracts the foundations of Enlightenment pedagogies.** Who or what gets to be acknowledged in the development of epistemology and its dissemination via teaching? Who or what is actually present in the creation of knowledge? **How do knowledge and being, ontology and epistemology fuse in the moment of ‘learning’ to create the very world we are studying and how do we wish to participate in that?** Asking how we might come to wish to participate agentically moves fused notions of onto-epistemology towards yet another diffraction: Karen Barad’s **onto-ethico-epistemology**. In Barad’s construction we **‘mark bodies’** as we come to know them, **scoring them and ourselves into painful and pleasurable being.** **Can we stay with this kind of trouble long enough to (un)learn?** The term onto-ethico-epistemology may be as much a mouthful to swallow for some pedagogues as it is to say, but the point is perhaps interesting and provides a challenge to current modalities shaping pedagogic practice. How might ‘we’ pedagogues interested in both decoloniality and posthumanism and where and how they might diffract practice when held together, conceive of an entanglement of ontology, epistemology and ethics? Moreover, could an understanding of teaching and learning via such an entanglement produce a state of affairs **where pedagogy becomes a site for the re-casting of the world away from Vitruvianisms?** Where justice is marked by the response-ability of a host of material-discursive phenomena finally given their agentic ‘voice’/‘space’/‘time’/‘self’. Where these become teachers of new practices, new knowledges, new performativities of human and nonhuman, new practices of decolonisation **that unravel the barbarisms of ‘Man’ and how ‘he’ has waged violence not only on minds, histories, genders, cultures and presents, but also on possible futures?** The essays that make up this Special Issue (SI) **diffract pedagogy through** such **posthuman prisms**, **speaking to and with decoloniality, vital materialism, affectivity,** post-qualitative research and a host of ambitions that come together to **trouble the theory/practice divide** in education from a position of decentring Vitruvian notions of the human. In this spirit, rather than remain solely at the level of critique each essay offers positive formulations of possible alternatives grounded in practice. In such urgent times, theory itself is not enough. We need to find practices to stay with the trouble stirred up by late capitalism in the anthropocene moment – a moment where ‘scholarship committed to the refusal if not the undoing of a world riven by new kinds of warcraft, injustice and exploitation’ requires the courage of action.5 ‘Beginning somewhere’ in the spirit of ‘one must begin somewhere’ with such a project requires that ‘we’ lay our first action carefully and thoughtfully. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak states: If the ‘somewhere’ that one begins from is the most privileged site of a neo-colonial educational system, in an institute for training teachers, funded by the state, does that gesture of convenience not become the normative point of departure? **Does not participation in such a privileged and authoritative apparatus require the greatest vigilance?**6 Thinking through this with Donna Haraway, one might say: **it matters what matters we use to think matters with.** Thus, in order for this SI to respond response-ably to ‘our’ current moment with all its violence and creativity, how might it responsibly begin?7 Perhaps, in truth it has already begun, bound in a bright and colourful paper cover, in an edition of a journal known for its radical approach to critical theories, peer reviewed by a host of largely white, tenured academics, edited by two Western(ised) editors filtrated through years of being located, if not quite within then at least closer to, the Vitruvian position of The Academy. In a sense, in order to critically contemplate all this, this SI in actual fact, starts from somewhere in the middle with a powerfully constructed argument offered by Michalinos Zembylas. Zembylas argues for the entanglement of decoloniality and posthumanism in developing approaches to teaching and learning that ‘open up radical possibilities for both cultivating an ethics of relational ways of being and knowing and giving priority to the task of decolonisation.’8 Zembylas suggests throughout that re-thinking a posthumanist form of education must involve a tenacious awareness of just how easy it is to inadvertently ‘replac[e] one form of humanistic Higher Education with another’. Instead of falling into this trap, the author suggests a **critical vigilance** ‘that pays adequate ethical and political attention to the complex task of **dismantling the systematic and widespread linkages between humanist knowledges with coloniality’**. The article goes about this by combining the work of **Sylvia Wynter** and her consideration of reconstructions of curricula from a decolonial perspective with the work of Rosi Braidotti in her challenge to ‘the ethics, politics and epistemology of western humanism embedded in university curricula and pedagogies’, and how her approach **‘creates openings to resist the neoliberal order of higher education’.**9 Zembylas’ tone is one of impassioned caution, raising questions that are arguably vital to the creation of fully aware, posthuman approaches to pedagogy – namely, **can we pedagogues** aiming to work with posthumanism to **disentangle the academy from the proliferation of humanist Vitruvianism in all its exclusive and exclusionary guises.** Can we find ways to commit responsibly to such a project via a vital awareness of just how easy it is to slip back into humanism when decoloniality is not close to the heart of our endeavours? In service of this aim, Zembylas suggests that the two fields entangle together to ‘pluraversalise’ the task ahead.10 This challenge acts as an important cautionary tale of sorts and in the spirit of bold and critically aware beginnings (albeit from the middle – as mentioned earlier), aims to start the reader of this SI off on an important critical note: beware what you wish for – for who or what is wishing. Following Zembylas comes the offering from Asilia Franklin-Phipps and Courtney Rath. It is rare, perhaps, to find an article – and a short one at that – that truly gets one up off one’s chair with excitement. Viewpoints are designed to be just that, to offer a glimpse of the world(s) from within someone else’s vision of what justice-to-come might look like, and this article does just that with tenacity, humour and boldness. Franklin-Phipps and Rath’s polemical account urges us to stay with the trouble11 of ‘keep[ing] educational spaces safe from **the corporatizing forces of neoliberalism**, **forces that insist inclusion is a remedy for oppression,** forces that insist learning outcomes are the equivalent of knowledge, **forces that insist the intellectual freedom of scholars is less important than the comfort of those they challenge**, in the classroom and in the public.’12 **The dangers of ‘remaking children in the image of an educated (white, male, economically stable person)’ are** discussed as **a means of replicating/providing salvific futures.** In contrast to this, Donna Haraway’s notion of making kin is turned to as a form of practice, not just a theory. Indeed, the authors state unequivocally that ‘we cannot theorize teacher education differently, whilst teaching as we always have’, calling into question the separation between teaching and research in order to upend the violence that uncritical forms of pedagogy does by virtue of simply paying lip service to the idea of decoloniality. Ontological possibilities, **challenges to humanist notions of progress, widening the domain of what counts as competency,** all these things are considered brightly, passionately and urgently in the aptly titled: How to Become Less Deadly.13

#### Economic redistribution through antitrust is the perfection of terra nullius – the evacuation and clearing of Indigenous presence from the land to enable genocidal plunder.

Arruda 2016

(James, “Settler Colonialism and Mainstream Economics”, Master’s Thesis for a degree in Environmental Studies @ York University-Toronto, <http://fes.yorku.ca/files/documents/research/outstanding_papers/Arruda_J.pdf>)

A particular tragedy and contradiction in mainstream economics is its manufactured background story. The presuppositions underlying the narrative of the discipline generally mirror a biased worldview; in general, that of an isolated individual performing rational (optimizing) decisions within a closed system (Pratten, 2007; 2004). Feminist economists argue that this model individual is also white, colonial, male11 (Grappard, 1995). The story of individuals constantly taking selfish and rational decisions within a closed world informs the methodology used by economists. With a narrow experience of life, the constructed nature of existence (ontology) inscribed within mainstream economics generates unreliable knowledge production tools (epistemology) about the economy—a complex system in which collectives of individuals live and exchange with each other. Furthermore, mainstream economics epistemology employs mathematical and deductivist tools. Critical realism12 argues that economics’ deductivist methodology is only appropriate to study a ‘small-closed-world’ system (Pratten, 1996; Spash, 2012). All in all, economic event regularities are deduced from an unreasonable and unrealistic ontology. For the Cambridge Journal of Economics co-editor Stephen Pratten (2007), the only path beyond mainstream economics is through the abandonment of the deductivist framework. This is a call for a complete epistemological revolution! I believe that to delegitimize institutions, their stories have to be delegitimized. If mathematical-deduction uses prior beliefs/stories to explain the past and predict the future, then a critical reformulation of economics ontology is absolutely required as well, but not sufficient. My ontological investigation of the discipline is inspired and drawn from revolutionary Indigenous feminist theorists. For instance, in I am Woman, Lee Maracle (1996) of the Sto:Loh nation pointedly argues that (mainstream) economics and mathematics are products of white (European) settler male worldviews. As a matter of fact, the latter character’s beliefs and experiences of the world are also at the root of mainstream economics ontology, and a catalyst for its form of knowledge production. My analytical focus is also informed by my Settler space of birth occupying Kanien’kehá:ka territory. It is also informed by my present space and (white settler male) character occupying the land protected by and shared between the Anishinaabe, Mississauga, and Haudenosaunee people, as per the Dish With One Spoon treaty. In this paper, I argue that the definitions of land13, wealth and economics in Canadian mainstream economics textbooks depict a Settler colonial ontology. Thesis Land. Wealth. Economics. These three interdependent words connect how we see and act in the world. In my opinion, land is loving, abundant, intelligent, and always remembers. Land encompasses a long list of wealth; life, resources, knowledge, stories. Land is wealth. Logically and ethically, an appropriate system of wealth exchange (an economy) can only be prosperous if it respectfully relies on land. An appropriate study of economics interlaces our material relationships with each other, with more-than-humans14 and with life all together. Yet, it is not sufficient to build a better economic way to relate to the land, while Settler institutions occupy Indigenous land and territories. Different forces of power are at play within the Settler colonial complex. In general, there are three ‘structures of invasion’: spaces, systems and stories. In Settler Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Barker and Lowman (2015) refer to these structures as they delve into the construction of Settlers in Canada. They elaborate on the types of Settler colonial invasions performed in Canada, which reinforce Settler power and authority over the land. In all instances, the spaces we15 take, the systems we build, and the stories we tell “are [ultimately] focused on the land” (Barker & Lowman, 2015, p. 31). First of all, ‘spaces’ as a structure of invasion is defined as the Settler colonial spaces that displace and replace Indigenous places (Barker et al., 2015). For example, the city of Toronto is a Settler colonial space since it intentionally covers and displaces Anishnaabe spaces. Second of all, ‘systems’ are constructed so that Settler colonialism can assert and develop itself (Barker & Lowman, 2015). The Indian Residential School system was a system that severed the ties of young Indigenous children from the land. Thirdly, the ‘stories’ created by Settlers to legitimize occupation, such as the ‘Peacemaker Myth’ and ‘Terra Nullius’, displaces Indigenous stories of land connection (Barker & Lowman, 2015). In the case of mainstream economics, the most relevant structures of invasion are the stories and systems it creates. Economic stories and systems that dismiss and replace Indigenous relations to land thus intentionally participate in the displacement and erasure of Indigenous spaces, systems and stories. Canadian economics textbooks regard land as given for free by nature (to Settlers) and (initially) without any agency16 to generate wealth, until Settlers improve and value the land. In other words, economics students assume that before the European arrival on (what is now commonly known as) North America, nature gave the land to the European Settlers—metaphorically understood, of course. All of nature’s contents was devoid of agency, and thus free for the new visitors (Settlers) to claim, to own. Completely ignoring wealth accumulation from land, the theoretical framework in Canadian economics textbooks does not question wealth distribution and mostly focuses on wealth production (see Green, 2013). Of course, wealth distribution and production occurs on land. Canadian economists nonetheless assume that all economic activities—in this case, production and distribution of wealth—begin on free and unoccupied land, transforming their respective spaces/locations (land) into improvable and privatized assets, ready for the (free) market. A Canadian definition of economics that does not encompass its socio-political (colonial) context is a structure that legitimizes Settler colonial invasion, against Indigenous peoples and their land. As such, young students who read, learn and interpret the world from Canadian economics textbooks do not face their complicity within Settler colonialism. Rather, they confidently reproduce their economic knowledge on unceded/stolen land. All in all, the underlying thesis of this chapter is that the constructed paradigm within Canadian standard economics textbooks derives from the imagination of a privileged and ahistorical Settler position of ‘objectivism’ and ‘authority’, camouflaged by Whiteness, by an empty ontology, and by storytelling derived from the dominant White Settler Male view.

**You should read this anti-curricula as a disturbance of the resolution’s traditional frame, which nevertheless creates crevices of radical dissensus. Welcome to debate’s impossible outside.**

**Kelsie 2019** (Amber E., Assistant Professor of the Practice/Associate Debate Coach at the School of Communication at Wake Forest University. PhD and MA in Communication, Media Studies, Cultural studies from the University of Pittsburgh. BA in African and African American Studies from Dartmouth University. “Blackened Debate at the End of the World” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 52, Number 1, 2019, pp. 63-70)DR 19

**We are haunted by the specter of civil war.** **Liberal and conservative politicians** and commentators openly express **anxiety about the possibility of** **outright hostilities** and the “unravelling [of ] our national fabric” (Gambino 2017). **Increasing polarization**, **identity politics that destroys persuasion**, **an atmosphere of conspiracy regarding the** deep **state** or foreign puppet masters, apparent **disenchantment with institutions**, general **mistrust in electoral politics**, a gridlocked and weak congress, and **open skirmishes between white nationalist and antifascists** are put forth as signs of the end times (see, e.g., Blight 2017; Wright 2017; DeGroot 2018; Smith 2018). **The looming crisis of the end of politics** that everywhere drives **the nostalgic desire for a return to a normalcy and civility** invites us **to rethink debate and to pose a different question that does not seek to redeem a past that never was** and continues to come **at too high a cost for the wretched of the earth**. Rather than **“make debate great again,”** I’d like to **sit with the vertigo** so as **to consider debate’s (im)possible outside**. Such a quest for a horizon that is before-after-immanent to the End (of politics or history or the world) will require **that we rethink the spatiotemporal coordinates of the entire liberal project that secures the parameters of debate** as **the dialectical and agonistic contestation of the possible**. **My central interlocutor here will be blackness**: **that (non)ontological constitutive outside of the modern grammar** that is relegated to the realm of **absolute necessity**, **negativity**, **incapacity**, and **pathology** **that subtends the political and the rhetorical**. **As that which is always already outside the World**/History, **blackness provides an anoriginary nonplace** from which to think crisis and **a politics of actualizing the impossible.** **Imminent civil war is an interesting but unsurprising anxiety**; it is unsurprising because **the U.S. Civil War informs so much of the popular narrative of the United States** and **its ethical position that confirms the progressive nature of time**, and because liberal sovereignty was always a war waged against civil war.1 And it is interesting because the **Greeks referred to civil war as “stasis**.” Today standing, state, and stability are also meanings of stasis, as it emerges from histemi. **Stasis** then doubles both as sovereignty and as sovereignty’s undoing and **evokes a constant permanence of war even in peace**. Stasis in rhetorical studies takes on the meaning of “issue” and serves as **a hermeneutic for coming to consensus on the point of contention from which debate proceeds**. Stasis here also means standing **in the sense that there is some “ground” in the form of prior consensus on the nature of the disagreement**.2 The somewhat paradoxical **relationship between consensus and dissensus found in stasis speaks to a kind of disavowal of ungroundedness that** **precedes even the point from which to begin speaking**. **Must one have a presupposed potentiality for a common ground to be able to proceed in argument?** **Refusing this disavowal of groundlessness as it emerges in contemporary figurations of agonistic debate** **might enable us to more accurately think of rhetoric in its modern inflection** **as** **the presupposition of a ground as a war against its own void via antiblackness**. The inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition is salient: **rhetoric is the continuation of war by other means**; rhetoric as **a mode of war in an effort to ontologize itself against its groundless outside**.3 The (im)possible is always at stake in debate since rhetoric regards the contingent as its necessary presupposition. According to Dilip Gaonkar, this “key, but largely unnoticed, assumption in contemporary rhetorical theory” finds its basis in Aristotle’s response to Plato’s charge of the unspecifiability of rhetoric (2004, 5). Instead of freeing us to reflect explicitly on the nature of contingency, Aristotle’s domestication of rhetoric by placing rhetoric within the domain of the “contingent, yet probable” has prompted most rhetorical scholars to forgo consideration of contingency in favor of the thematic of probability: doxa, constraints, norms, ideology. Contingency in these schemas tends to be considered as a property ascribed to statements, propositions, and rhetorical acts—to the ontic world that constitutes the context of the rhetor—rather than as a mode of the subject or the singular encounter that constitutes a rhetorical situation. The possibility of **rhetorical dialectic**, **that exigency that provides the opportunity for agonistic argument** that can be sublated into judgment, **animates historical progress** and **places debate as the ground for civic life**. **In the liberal understanding of contemporary debate**, **contingency takes on an interior spatial dimension as the possible content through a disavowal of the contingency of debate’s outside that is rendered impossible. To say that debate is impossible is then to beckon to war** on the horizon. It is to recognize the state of emergency as **the end of the state of debate. The historical legacy** of the U.S. Civil War **will not let us end it there however**, **because blackness haunts even civil war**, **and threatens stasis in both its senses with incoherence**. To leave raciality by the wayside is **to repeat the endless disavowal that what we are threatened with is civil war and not race war.** It is **to still recuperate this World though the dialectical resolution that can adjust antagonism to agonism**. **It is to wage liberal sovereignty’s war against civil war all over again.** **Polite discussions that acknowledge racial terror only so as to explain away racial violence** as the unique domain of extremists **maintain a sense of white innocence that not only individuates a structural condition**, **but also pathologizes and prohibits black utterance** (especially when that utterance might take on the form of rage) **by adjusting the impossible demands of blackness back to the acceptable terms of debate**. **Within such discussions, blackness can only appear as an afterthought**, as what Denise Ferreira da Silva terms the affectable I or outer-determined rather than self-determined subject in the onto-epistemological modern text (da Silva 2007). **Raciality is intrinsic to modernity because it is necessary for the construction of the Subject**—it names the materialization of the spatiotemporal forms that make the modern grammar. It creates the grounds for the self-determined subject. For da Silva, **nothing short of a fracturing of the spatiotemporal formal principles of understanding** that subtend historical and scientific knowledge **will redress the totality of racial violence**, especially as it concerns black folk. Let us then take seriously Du Bois’s insight into the actual U.S. Civil War that animates so many antiblack pathologies today: that **it was the black slaves**, not Lincoln nor the Union, **who won the war**; **and that it was the slaves**, and not the South, **who ultimately lost. For it was in the chaos and crisis of civil war that fugitivity realized freedom only to have it snatched away in Reconstruction**: “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery. . . . Democracy died save in the hearts of black folk” (Du Bois 1935, 30). In Black Reconstruction, we are gifted a tale of the violence of antiblack dialectic and the potential of black fugitivity. The common narrative that the North fought a war to end slavery and to preserve the Union figures the U.S. Civil War as a political battle concerning sovereignty and succession, or in the radical imagination as a battle for the future of capital between an industrial North and a pastoral planter economy in the South. **For Du Bois this cannot be the** whole or even essential part of the **story**, as **both narratives naturalize the position of the slave** and her nominal emancipation as derivative rather than active. In Du Bois’s account, **black liberation was never the terms on which the war was fought**; **the war was fought over competing concerns to limit the competition that black people posed to whites**, both as slave labor and as free labor. **The North for its part desired neither the abolition of slavery nor its expansion** into the western territories. **Northerners desired a resolution to an untenable status quo thrown into disequilibrium by competing visions for how best to subjugate the black population** to secure the white settlerist way of life. **It was not until the slaves, through the waging of the General Strike**, **showed the North the way to win the war that Lincoln reluctantly issued the Emancipation Proclamation** (Du Bois 1935, 82). **The General Strike was the moment in which the impossible was actualized**, through **an incisive refusal to continue under the terms presented**: “This was **not merely the desire to stop work**. It was **a strike on a wide basis against the conditions of work**. It was a general strike that involved directly in the end perhaps a half million people. **They wanted to stop the economy of the plantation system, and to do that they left the plantations**” (Du Bois 1935, 68). Significantly, Du Bois’s analysis of the Civil War extends beyond the Confederacy’s surrender in 1865 to the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of Jim Crow in 1878. The democracy to come was quickly sealed off in the compromises made between the North and the South that we call **Reconstruction**. Here **debate**, **both as contestation on common ground and as the resolution to war**, **could only re-elaborate black suffering through nominal emancipation**. In Reconstruction we witness how **the bargain was struck for a newly transformed American whiteness** produced through the sublation of the “Southern way of life” (the fantasy of which still animates grievances on the Right), but **against black life**. **The reinstantiation of master-slave relationships** in confederate amnesty, **black codes**, the **Thirteenth Amendment**, **vagrancy laws**, **convict leasing**, **extralegal terror**, **and** **the ongoing sentimental and material expropriation of total value from the slave that sustains global capital constitutes the emergence of the “afterlife of slavery”** that characterizes our present (Hartman 1997). Du Bois’s analysis disrupts the spatiotemporal coordinates of the political to think the (im)possibility of black politics and liberation. **To think** with and **through blackness means that we cannot think the Civil War as a demarcated event** **distinct from Reconstruction and Jim Crow**, or think the stasis of contestation between the divisions of a polity. **We must abandon the liberal notion of progress that “accumulates . . . [and] . . . captures” black suffering in the name of securing an antiblack future** as well as the appeal of universality and particularity which spatially “arrests Blackness’s creative potential” (Dillon 2013, 42; da Silva 2014, 84). According to da Silva, “such an understanding of total value [of slavery for the creation of the World] requires a suspension of the view that all there is is in Time and Space . . . **the radical force of Blackness lies at the turn of thought—that is, Blackness knowing and studying announces the End of the World as we know it”** (2014, 84, emphasis mine). Da Silva joins a growing number of black scholars in many different disciplinary homes thinking through the metaphysics of blackness as that which is ungrounded and ontologically null with respect to the modern onto-epistemological paradigm.4 In the World that ontologizes antiblackness and racial capitalism, the calculus of racial terror exceeds and makes possible recognition through the reduction of blackness to the figure of the Slave. The middle passage here is metonymic, naming the production of anagrammatical blackness through the ongoing logistic of being captured and shipped, **that reduces blackness from body to flesh, “that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse” (Sharpe 2016; Spillers 1987, 67).** **Such a proposition returns raciality, specifically blackness and antiblackness, to the analysis of what grounds debate’s (im)possibility.** **What would it mean to think debate as a praxis of the impossible?** To think **a blackened debate not as the presupposition of a ground through approximation to an antiblack human** genre of Man, the Subject or the transparent I, **but as** Harney and Moten say, “jurisgenerative **black social life”** (2017, 15)? **We would need to rethink** **the** cherished **terms of rhetoric itself**. **We might think debate not as dialectic that both precedes and proceeds from stasis**, **but as the refusal of “the call to order” that opens up black forms of life**, even as form is placed under erasure (Halberstam 2013, 9). **From this vantage point of blackness**, which is not really a vantage point at all, but **a being out of place and time**, **of Being under erasure in the condition of mutual dispossession**, **we might begin to sketch other visions that deactivate rhetoric’s ontologizing premises**, to hold for a moment, **in the hold and in the wake**, not grounded but oceanic movement, decay and life, where even dead things become something else. It is here and happening all the time in the marooned spaces of the world. **In studying debate’s (im)possibility, we might theorize at the End of the World as a praxis oriented toward its abolition.**

# 2AC

## Set Col

### Ontology Debate

#### AND The crucial locus for the ontological antagonism is the production of Western Man as a Knower: which detaches knowledge from its use value and turns on itself through racialization and colonialism.

Sylvia Wynter ’03 ( Professor Emerita at Stanford University, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3, Fall)

To sum up: this means that the epochal rupture that was set in motion by Western intellectuals, by means of which human knowledge of the physical cosmos would be freed from having to be known in the adaptive truthfor terms that had been hitherto indispensable to the instituting of all human orders and their respective modes/genres of being human—the rupture that was to lead to the gradual development of the physical sciences— had been made possible only by the no less epochal reinvention of Western Europe’s matrix Judeo-Christian genre of the human, in its first secularizing if still hybridly religio-secular terms as Man as the Rational Self and political subject of the state, in the reoccupied place of the True Christian Self, or mode of sociogeny, of Latin-Christian Europe; by the reinvention also of the secular entity of the West in the reoccupied place of the latter, with this reinvention being based on the model of Virgil’s Roman imperial epic. This takes us back to the negative aspect of the dialectical process of culture- historical transformation by which the West was to initiate the first phase of the degodding of its descriptive statement of the human, thereby also initiating the processes that were to lead to the development of the new order of nonadaptive cognition that is the natural sciences. Since it was to be in the specific terms of this reinvention—one in which while, as Christians, the peoples of the West would see themselves as one religious genre of the human, even where they were to be convinced that theirs was the only true religion, and indeed, as Lyotard points out, were unable to conceive of an Other to what they called God—as Man, they would now not only come to overrepresent their conception of the human (by means of a sustained rhetorical strategy based on the topos of iconicity [Valesio 1980]) as the human, thereby coming to invent, label, and institutionalize the indigenous peoples of the Americas as well as the transported enslaved Black Africans as the physical referent of the projected irrational/subrational Human Other to its civic-humanist, rational self-conception. The West would therefore remain unable, from then on, to conceive of an Other to what it calls human—an Other, therefore, to its correlated postulates of power, truth, freedom. All other modes of being human would instead have to be seen not as the alternative modes of being human that they are “out there,” but adaptively, as the lack of the West’s ontologically absolute self description. This at the same time as its genuine difference from all others (i.e., its secularizing reinvention of its matrix religious identity from the Renaissance onwards as that of Man in two forms—one ratiocentric and still hybridly religio-secular, the other purely secular and biocentric) would remain overseen, even non-theorizable within the acultural premise on whose basis it had effected the reinvention of its matrix Christian genre or theological “descriptive statement” of the human. This central oversight would then enable both Western and westernized intellectuals to systemically repress what Geertz has identified as the “fugitive truth” of its own “local culturality” (Geertz 1983)—of, in Bruno Latour’s terms, its specific “constitution with a capital C,” or cultural constitution that underlies and charters our present order, as the parallel constitutions of all other human orders that Western anthropologists have brilliantly elucidated underlie and charter all other human orders (Latour 1991)—doing so according to the same hybrid nature-culture, ontogeny/sociogeny laws or rules. With this systemic repression ensuring that we oversee (thereby failing to recognize) the culture and class-specific relativity of our present mode of being human: Man in the second, transumed, and now purely biocentric and homo oeconomicus form of that first invention that was to lead to Winant’s “immense historical rupture,” to Quijano’s “Racism/Ethnicism” complex, and to Mignolo’s modernity/coloniality complementarity.

### Link Level

#### Link turn - Over-identifying violated settler bodies as the nexus of black knowing feeds a biocentric understanding of racialization.

Katherine McKittrick 16 (Queen’s University, Canada, “Diachronic loops/deadweight tonnage/bad made measure,” cultural geographies 2016, Vol. 23(1) 3– 18)

This article is a relational conversation nested in black studies, science studies of blackness and race, geographies of knowledge, and black creative text. The overlying purpose is to address how the social production of biologically determinist racial scripts – which extend from a biocentric conception of the human – can be dislodged by bringing studies of blackness in/and science into conversation with autopoietics, black Atlantic livingness, weights and measures, and poetry. A biocentric conception of the human, it should be noted up front, refers to the law-like order of knowledge that posits a Darwinian narrative of the human – that we are purely biological and bioevolutionary beings – as universal.3 It assumes, then, that we are bio-evolutionary humans that do not author this racially coded bio-evolutionary script; it assumes that the human is inherently, and all, natural (produced only by nature), which, in turn, situates black subjects as naturally unevolved. As will be discussed later, as well, a biocentric conception of the human can also underwrite research that seeks to show how the biologics of race is socially constructed. My discussion is implicitly informed by a series of geographic tensions – precisely because the discipline of geography and the sub-disciplines of cultural and social geographies open up and close down black studies in meaningful ways. Indeed, many research projects in cultural and social geographies importantly track how the social production of race is spatially enacted and how marginalized communities negotiate and live out a range of ongoing plantocratic and colonial racial violences.4 These geographic violences are haunted by positivism – the social scientific and empirical verification of racial, gendered, classed, queered, and locational differences – which has led to the ongoing exposure of lingering and false scientific racisms and biologically deterministic scripts.5 With this in mind, and as I have argued in a different context, a large cluster of analytical work on race – and specifically blackness – draws attention to the unjust racial violences imposed on black bodies.6 Some analyses of the violated black body are coupled with oppositional narratives, wherein black embodied knowledge is (rightly) valued as a site of resistance. While this embodied-black-situated-knowledge importantly informs the production of space and provides a way to rethink our collective political epistemological grounds, I wonder how it also continually situates biologic skin – only the bodies – as essential to alternative non-patriarchal–non-Eurocentric mappings. Put another way, what happens when racial knowledge is mobilized solely as a site of violation through which resistant corporeal epistemologies are tasked with illuminating the inequities that underwrite the production of space? How are discussions of race and space and knowledge tethered to an analytics of embodiment that can only posit black knowledge as biologic knowledge? Does this foreclose the ways in which alternative racial configurations are, or can be, collectively and relationally and spatially liberatory and, perhaps, staging a range of black knowledge formations that, while certainly embodied, are not reduced to the biologic? Indeed, we must ask ourselves – and I ask myself this often – how black bodies rather than black people are informing how we understand the production of space and the production of knowledge and, as well, how these bodies that tidily uphold our academic ideas inadvertently or explicitly replicate a biocentric order.7 This is an urgent geographic problem – inside and outside the discipline of geography – because black knowledge is analytically posited as a priori biologic (a violated body that bodyknowledge emanates from) and is therefore already marginal or excluded or outside how we know. These racial geographies and lingering racisms can, we well know, seep into analyses too, by disciplining, through the production of academic space and through the racial codification of scholarly rules, how race is theorized, lived, debated, departmentalized, inter-departmentalized, and mapped out in university settings.8 The underlying purpose of this article is to think about how engaging interdisciplinarity and forging relational knowledges assist in anti-colonial academic research and teaching while also disrupting biocentric scripts, disciplined ways of knowing, and the spatial workings of knowledge. With both of these purposes in mind, the discussion cues Frantz Fanon, noticing that Black Skin, White Masks is, among other things, an interdisciplinary text: in this work, Fanon asks that we not only unsettle the fact of blackness but also read across a range of texts and sources – poetry, psychiatric studies, archives, jazz, fiction, philosophy, folklore – in order to make this unsettlement possible.9 What Fanon alerts us to is how the act of disciplining of thought (the process of habitually delimiting what we know about blackness according to colonial perimeters) stabilizes race and perpetuates anti-blackness. More specifically, the biocentric logic of race, which sorts and assesses bodies according to the phenotype and attendant evolutionary scripts, is part of a larger commonsense belief system that seemingly knows and thus stabilizes the biological data that validate unevolved black deviance; this belief system thus knows, in advance, who should live, who should survive, who should die, who is naturally selected, and who is naturally unselected. Indeed, this biocentric belief system is steadily carried forward (or paid forward!) – not articulating itself in the same way over time and space, but certainly shaping what we think we know about, and how we know, black people. Drawing on Fanon’s unsettling of disciplinary thinking (precisely because the aforementioned anti-black logic he takes apart in his text continues to reverberate and circulate in the present), I address how biocentricity can discursively discipline and delimit our analytical approach to race and racism. The interplay between race, biology, blackness, and science, I argue, undermines the undisciplined and interdisciplined workings of black intellectual life. Part of what I am suggesting, then, emerges from the many black studies that rely on a variety of sources (bringing music and math to sociology, bringing science and history to poetry, bringing slave narratives and psychoanalysis to feminism, and everything in between) in order to study, convey, talk about, and undo race and racism.10 This is why, as I note above, Frantz Fanon writes Black Skin, White Masks not only through and with the eyes of a psychiatrist but also through and with the eyes that have spent a lot of time reading and writing about fiction, activism, music, philosophy, historical narrative and primary sources, science, psychoanalysis, medical studies and journals, poetry, psychiatry, and more. In what follows, I explore the conceptual possibilities that emerge from the kind of radical interdisciplinary black studies Fanon utilizes in Black Skin, White Masks. I suggest that paying close attention to, drawing out, and forging relational knowledges provide us, as academics and thinkers who are invested in undoing the deadly yet normalized workings of anti-blackness, with analytical mechanisms that allow us to do anti-colonial work in a variety of university settings that, as we know, were not built to support or recognize marginalized communities and intellectuals. Part of the intellectual task, then, is to work out how different kinds and types of voices relate to each other and open up unexpected and surprising ways to think about liberation, knowledge, justice, history, race, gender, narrative, and blackness. In terms of black studies, the task is not to measure and assess the unfree – and seek consolation in naming violence – but rather posit that many divergent and different and relational voices of unfreedom are analytical and intellectual sites that can tell us something new about our academic concerns and our anticolonial futures. This article has four parts that are to be read in tandem. These are narratives and ideas that I have brought together because I believe that they relate to each other and because I believe that, in their relationality, they momentarily unsettle how blackness is read within and against scientific narratives. Part 1 is a very brief overview of how race is taken up in science studies that also thinks about how the dynamics of race in/and science can be read as an autopoietic system. Part 2, drawing on the work of Sylvia Wynter, provides an analytic pathway to reorienting the discursive scientific data of race and blackness. In part 3, I introduce the slave ship The Zong through four relational vignettes: history, weights and measures, social theory, and poetry. These vignettes, together, allow me to read the slave ship as a historically present living system that articulates the unexpected promise of science. The overarching work of the vignettes, and the paper as a whole, is to push up against the tendency to read blackness in/and science through a singular analytical model – biological determinism – that taxonomizes black subjects.11 I conclude with a brief discussion that addresses the difficulties of reading, teaching, and analyzing racial violence, particularly when we rely on data sets that seek to make race knowable in terms that socially produce the biology of race. While each section has textual boundaries, these parts and pieces of data, and theory and narrative, when read in tandem, draw attention to an analytical praxis that, I hope at least momentarily, demonstrates that thinking, writing, and talking blackness, analytically and ethically, is a productive, interdisciplinary, and undisciplined experiment in black studies.

#### Their focus on local resistance precludes our investigation of global resistance towards capitalism and the creation of western man through homo economus.

Hennessy 2K — Professor of Humanities and the English Department Chair at Rice University (Rosemary, *Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism*, p. 6-9)

The contradiction between the material realities that shape individual lives and our ways of experiencing them (feeling we are “good” women for the exploited work we do, blaming ourselves when we fail to juggle the pressures to compete and to serve, etc.) are inevitable in capitalism because capitalism relies on and continually reproduces ways of knowing and feeling that conceal the exploitative human relations that the accumulation of profit requires. Capitalism’s contradictory social arrangements affect societies across the globe differently and unevenly, and yet the ways these effects register and are known — or are distorted — in local communities and individual lives may often share common patterns. Many contradictions are not seen or experienced as local instances of a global social system because the ways of knowing that are most available do not allow them to be understood this way. Moreover, the social mechanisms for keeping capitalism’s structures and abuses invisible are long-standing, widely shared, often unconscious, and very effective. Basic to the structure of late capitalism is a new global division of labor. Of course, capitalism has relied on an international division of labor since its inception, and so strictly speaking it has always been global. The industrial take-off in early-nineteenth-century Europe was possible because of the accumulation of wealth accrued from colonies all over the globe, and the development of monopoly capitalism in Europe and the United States depended on finding sources of raw materials and expanding markets in far-flung colonial territories. What distinguishes late capitalism’s global division of labor is the way new technologies have accelerated the speed and dispersed the space of production to unprecedented levels. Although late capitalism has magnified the homogenization of social relations and cultural forms, it is also characterized by unprecedented fragmentation of the production process into subnational localities. Since the end of World War II, and to an intensified degree since the 1970s, production has become increasingly flexible as capital seeks out those spaces for production that offer the cheapest labor source and the least political interference. This has meant that production is no longer centered entirely in a single site, and it no longer takes place primarily on the assembly line. Instead, production relies on heightened mobility, and on time and space compression — making use of profit-enhancing strategies like small batch, just-in-time production, and outsourcing, with the manufacture and assembly of component parts sometimes spread over continents or diffused into “private” homework. Late capitalism is also more intensely transnational in the sense that a network of industrial and service formations rather than a single nation serves as its center, and the transnational corporation is now the prime determiner of capital transmission. These changes in production have challenged and recast the post– World War II division of geopolitics into first, second, and third worlds. The “second world” of the Soviet bloc has virtually disappeared; parts of the “undeveloped third world” are full and competitive participants in transnational capital exchange and are saturated with first-world corporations and commodities, while parts of the “first world” harbor relations of production and ways of life that are indistinguishable from conditions in many third-world countries. Flexible production has made organized resistance by labor more difficult and the terms for those who do not participate efficiently in late capitalist production more arrogant and absolute: nonplayers are simply moved out of capital’s pathways (Dirlik 32). Culturally this interplay between global homogenization and subnational fragmentation has registered in new forms of consciousness and transnational identity — multiculturalism for one, and more gender-flexible sexual identities for another — that coexist with or are being articulated into the prevailing values and norms of Europe and the United States (Dirlik 28– 31). Late capitalism’s new economic, political, and cultural structures have also intensified the relationship between global and local situations. Global transnational corporations rely on localities of many sorts as sites for capital accumulation through production, marketing, and knowledgemaking. Global-localism has become both the paradigm of production and an explicit new strategy by which the corporation infiltrates various localities without forfeiting its global aims (Dirlik 34). From corporate headquarters, CEOs orchestrate the incorporation of particular localities into the demands of global capital at the same time that the corporation is domesticated into the local society. Thus it is in the interests of global capitalism to celebrate and enhance awareness of local communities, cultures, and forms of identification. But this cannot be done in a way that makes evident their exploitation, that is, in a way that makes visible the real material relationship between the global and the local (Dirlik 35). Against capitalism’s penetration of local communities, many “local” groups — indigenous people’s movements, ethnic and women’s organizations, lesbian, gay, and transgender rights movements — have presented themselves as potential sites for liberation struggles. Undoubtedly, these struggles have indeed accomplished changes that have enhanced the quality of life for countless people. But the celebration of “the local” as a self-defined space for the affirmation of cultural identity and the formation of political resistance often also play into late capitalism’s opportunistic use of localizing — not just as an arrangement of production but also as a structure of knowing. The turn to “the local” has also been the characteristic talisman of a postmodern culture and politics that has repudiated the totalizing narratives of modernity. The claims of indigenous and ethnic groups, of women, and of lesbian and gay people have been an important part of postmodern challenges to the adequacy of cultural narratives — among them enlightened humanism and Eurocentric scholarship — that do not address the histories of subaltern peoples. However, insofar as their counter-narratives put forward an alternative that de-links the interests of particular social groups from the larger collective that they are part of, they tend to promote political projects that keep the structures of capitalism invisible.

### Alt

#### Only the alt can solve for the creation and explanation of violence - Black and indegenous calls for humanity can un-suture the world as we know it because the way Human is crafted maintains the unhumanity of some as a tool of control via the police and settler state King 17

(Tiffany Lethabo, assistant professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 162-185 DH)

Because of this, Musser refuses to read sensations like masochism in an exceptional vein. She explains, “I seek to reinvigorate these other ways of reading masochism, particularly because reading it as exceptional reifies norms of whiteness and masculinity and suppresses other modes of reading power, agency, and experience.”45 As Musser suspects, those who claim a radical subjectless must do so through the abjection of others. Men who claim masochism must become like (or reify) the position of the feminineas- debased other without a self in order to then occupy this position of subjectlessness. A fixing of an abject position through the (female, Black, Indige nous) body of the other must occur; then, an evacuation of the other’s body must take place in order for the embalming of or supplanting of the body with the white normative male figure. While Musser does not entirely refuse Deleuze and Guattari’s nonrepresentational gesture, she does practice a kind of detached and suspicious read of the forms of violence that can be enacted in white moves beyond the human. Musser treats queer theories’ evangelists of loss and futurelessness, Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, as nonexceptional and even potentially dangerous to subjects who inhabit the abject spaces that white bourgeois men try to occupy. In the 2015 GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Zakiyyah Iman Jackson reiterated the suspicion that posthumanism is a ruse for white human ascendency. Similar to Musser, Jackson knows that there is often a subject lurking within the bowels or lines of nonrepresentational discourse. Jackson indicts posthumanist calls to move to the “beyond” for reproducing a false and dishonest European transcendentalism. Thus a call for movement in the direction of the “beyond,” issued in a manner that suggests that this call is without location, and therefore with the appearance of incognizance regarding its situated claims and internal limits, returns us to a Eurocentric transcendentalism long challenged.46 Jackson argues that a call for movement beyond always happens from a very specific place. The posthumanist’s horn often blows from a place situated securely within the folds of humanity. This is a very different place than the space of nonbeing from which Black and Indigenous peoples moan, sing, or speak. Native feminist refusal and Black feminist abolitionist skepticism function as intervening comportments, dispositions, and modes of critique that expose the violent and unself- conscious ways that Western theory attempts to move beyond the human through the annihilation of the Other. Because the crafting of the human is a process of relations, specifically the relations of negation, then moving beyond the violence of the human is also a relational process. Transcendence is a relational process of accountability. White subjects cannot transcend identity (e.g., whiteness, queerness), the subject (self- writing and autonomy), or the human (self- actualization) without ending Native genocide and anti- Black racism. Identities, subjects, and the human as they are currently configured come into formation through processes of negation. If there is no plan to enable Black and Indigenous life, then there is no transcending the violence of the human. The scholarship of Native/Indigenous and Black feminists force continental theory to come outside itself and gaze on the way even the various attempts of nonrepresentational theory to annihilate the self actually end up reinventing the subject and the human through new forms of violent invention. This article argues that both refusal and skepticism can work in tandem and interrupt the performance of white innocence through less- than- effective attempts to evade representation that jettison the garb of the human without abolishing the need for Black and Indigenous death.47 So what of Black and Native stakes in identity? If the primary concern for Black and Native studies is to interrogate and then destroy the structures and lineaments that make the human- as- man possible, then Black and Native people do not necessarily seek to inhabit the space of the human or identity as they currently exist. For example, if Black Lives Matter (BLM) is asking to be absorbed into the category of the human, then BLM’s version of the human does not yet exist. Further, if Black lives were to be absorbed into the category of the human, the social order and the scaffolding that upends and holds together the human would collapse. For example, if Black Lives Matter (as a variety of local chapters with their own unique politics) is actually making an appeal to be included within humanity— as an intelligible identity of the living— the request is also accompanied by a demand for the abolition of the police. In addition to the BLM movement and its various local chapters, the Black Youth Project, the Trayvon Martin Organizing Committee, and other voices of Black revolt are emerging from within and outside the movement and are calling for the abolition of the police state.48 If the human is to exist in Black form, then the police state must wither away. Reflecting on the Rodney King case and the initials N.H.I., Wynter effectively illustrates how the police state has the power to confer the identity of “human” or “no human.”49 If the goal of Black activists to abolish the police is achieved, the police state would no longer have the power to decide who was or who was not human. Further, if Native people were to be fully incorporated into the category of the human, then the United States would cease to exist. The nation- state (United States) that gives the “absolute” human (white “Americans”) excusive claims to the category of the human would have to be demolished. When the United States, as the practice of genocide itself, ceases to exist, then Native/Indigenous peoples can exist and identify as human. Rather than quibbling about “identity” itself, practices of Native refusal and decolonization and Black “skepticism/pessimism” and abolition argue that the U.S. police state can no longer determine the conditions of possibility for being considered human. Critical ethnic studies can continue to look to Black and Native resistance against state- sanctioned killing and genocide as the praxis and theory that shift the terms of contemporary discussions and contestations over identity.

#### Diasporic conceptions of settler co risk entrenching Western Man as the naturalized icon of humanity.

Alexander G. Weheliye ’14 (Associate professor of African American studies at Northwestern University, HABEAS VISCUS Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human, )

It is important that Wynter formulates these ideas from the liminal standpoint of black studies—even more specifically from the Caribbean as the primal scene of the protracted modern colonization of the Americas—showing how racialization remains vital to the ways we experience our being-in-the-world. In addition, Wynter's model ushers us away from thinking race via the conduits of chromatism, which simply reaffirms the putatively biological basis of this category, or the radical particularity of black life and culture, which accepts too easily the unimpeachable reality of the “Man-as-human” episteme. By contrast, the insights reaped from the comparison of different black populations in recent formulations of black diaspora studies tend to reinforce exactly this particularity, thereby consenting to the current governing manifestation of the human as synonymous with western Man. Instead, Wynter constructs a model of black studies that has as its object of knowledge the role of racialization in shaping the modern human and that takes the resultant liminal vantage point as an occasion for the imagination of other forms of being and becoming human. Wynter's focus on racial coloniality vis-à-vis physiology is especially relevant today given the rising significance of genomic theories of race in science, industry, and public policy, and, conversely, the recent almost wholesale turn away from discussions about race and biology on the academic left, as well as the depoliticization of biology, especially physiology, frequently found in affect theory.45 Wynter's and Spillers's thinking provides alternate genealogies for theorizing the ideological and physiological mechanics of the violently tiered categorization of the human species in western modernity, which stand counter to the universalizing but resolutely Europe-centered visions embodied by bare life and biopolitics. They do so—in stark contrast to Foucault and Agamben—without demoting race and gender to the rank of the ethnographically particular, instead exposing how these categories carve from the swamps of slavery and colonialism the very flesh and bones of modern Man. Wynter's idea of black studies runs counter to the mobilization of black studies in the service of a discourse of black particularity established by the conventions of inter- or intraracial comparison. In Wynter's vocabulary, diaspora discourse, although containing the possibility of defacing one of Man's most significant instruments of subjection—the nation-state—tends to focus on the map rather than territory, thereby not challenging reigning conceptions of community. The recent prominence of diaspora discourse in black studies has supplanted the emphasis on African American identity that defined the field for some time with the interrogation of U.S. black life within and against the context of other diasporic groups. The nominal passage from black studies to African American studies and now diaspora studies sets some of the groundwork for querying the conceptual underpinnings of these developments.46 Replacing the designation black with African American signals foremost a turn away from a primarily political category toward an identitarian marker of cultural and/or ethnic specificity; diaspora suggests a concurrent de-emphasizing of specificities in the embrace of transnational frames of reference and a return of said particularities via the comparison of black populations that differ in nationality. The turn to the diaspora concept in the history of black studies and the coterminous reign of the transnational paradigm in American studies frequently position the nation as a dialectical stepping-stone toward a supranational sphere that appears as more desirable than its national shadow. Still, these discourses often replicate and reify the very nation form they are seeking to escape in their comparison of different national literatures, cultures, languages, and so on. Though at the outset it appears as if this approach seeks to present a “planetary imagination” of blackness that surpasses “African American hegemony and/or provinciality,” diaspora studies's reliance on comparison frequently affirms the given instead of providing avenues for the conjuring of alternate possibilities.47 By so determinedly stressing the disparities between these different nationally located communities, these inquiries run the risk of interpellating individual African diasporas, whether in Europe, the United States, or the Caribbean, as primordially constituted beacons of racial kinship. Instead of a transnational ethnic notion of peoplehood that unites all African-descended subjects around the globe, national boundaries, or linguistic differences that often help define the national ones, become the ultimate indicators of differentiation. In this process, national borders and/or linguistic differences are in danger of entering the discursive record as ontological absolutes, rather than as structures and institutions that have served again and again to relegate black subjects to the status of western modernity's nonhuman other, or, as Katherine McKittrick describes the dangers of diaspora discourse: “Diaspora has the potential to be a hegemonic geographic project, a renewed version of Man's classificatory-exclusionary-bourgeoisie-spaces-for-us-spaces-for-them (them-as-the-absolute-Other)—unless, I think, we fill it with human life, attend to its radical creolized potential, and continue to insist that mapping diaspora is an ethical and unresolved politic, a really human, human geography.”48 My point is that the turn away from envisioning the African diaspora as a transcendental racial bond to series of radical differences can unwillingly lead to the importation of what Etienne Balibar calls the “nation form” into diaspora discourse. Balibar describes the process by which collectivities are transformed into “the people” in the following fashion: “Social formations…[are] represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions.”49 This “natural community” also constitutes a spectral grammar of current diaspora discourse. Given that peoplehood represents the foremost mode of imagining, (re)-producing, and legislating community, and thus managing inequality in the intertwined histories of capitalism and the nation-state, peoplehood sneaks in as the de facto actualization of diasporas in the national context, especially when we avoid specifying how black collectivity might be codified in the absence of this category. Thus, in the parlance of comparison, diasporic populations appear as real objects instead of objects of knowledge. The particularities of national diasporic groupings occupy central positions in current diaspora discourse, and they do so through the lens of the comparative method. As a result, the empirical existence of national boundaries, or linguistic differences that often help define the national ones, become the ultimate indicators of differentiation and are in danger of entering the discursive record as transcendental truths, rather than as structures and institutions that have served repeatedly to relegate black subjects to the status of western modernity's nonhuman other. Blackness, however, cannot be defined as primarily empirical nor understood as the nonproperty of particular subjects, but should be understood as an integral structuring assemblage of the modern human. Once we take this into account, we can practice a politics, which, rather than succumbing to the brutal facticity of blackness, introduces invention into existence, as Frantz Fanon argues.50 This is precisely what the insistence on the existent variations between nationally bound Afro-diasporic groups in diaspora studies jeopardizes: the entry of invention into the regions of blackness and, therefore, humanity.51 The twinning of comparativity and specificity does not allow for the initiation of different humanities, particularly because it fails to probe the foundations upon which these particularities are put and kept in place. Instead, we might do well to conceive humanity as a relational ontological totality, however fractured this totality might be. Not doing so will extend the conflation of one genre of the human: western Man with a real object (extrahumanly instituted and based completely in physiology) instead of viewing humanity as a “complex and differentially articulated structure in dominance of the social totality that constitutes the social formation arising from a determinate mode of production.”52 Black studies can and should take up a pivotal position in this process, because analyses of racialization have the potential to disarticulate the human from Man, thus metamorphosing humanity into a relational object of knowledge.

# 1AR

## K---Settler Colonialism

### 1AR ⁠— Alternative

#### The alt enacts a ruse of analogy that engulfs black scholarship and reduces slavery to a derivative of colonization

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What the Settler and the “Savage” share is a capacity for time and space coherence. At every scale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective “mapness” is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the “Savage” and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers, and displacements. (Wilderson 2010:181) Geography’s discursive attachment to stasis and physicality, the idea that space “just is”, and that space and place are merely containers for human complexities and social relations is terribly seductive ... (McKittrick 2006:xi) Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor” (2012) has significantly influenced a growing body of literature on settler colonialism, intervening especially in decolonial geographies, methodologies, and pedagogies (e.g. Antoine 2017; Patel 2014; Zaragocin 2019). The essay has been widely circulated in activist spaces, finding its way onto the #standingrocksyllabus, the reading lists of Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) chapters, and classrooms and workshops across the continent. The political reception of the essay reflects its broader socio-historical context, as it has become a resource for Indigenous activists and their allies seeking reorientation following the failures of Occupy Wall Street, and it has provided nourishment for resurging Indigenous movements, such as Idle No More and NoDAPL. In and beyond the immediate context, Tuck and Yang participate in contemporary iterations of decolonial struggle that seek to redress the longue duree of modernity, its expression as settler colonialism, and the endlessly expanding pile of wreckage that it produces. But the essay not only reflects a socio-historical context—it articulates a metaphysical orientation towards text and context. Most obviously, Tuck and Yang’s titular imperative rehearses a well-known take on the structure of metaphor. When metaphor “invades decolonization” (Tuck and Yang 2012:3) the very possibility of decolonization is destroyed, as it is stolen from its literal referent and transported to the realm of semantic superabundance. Recovering and reviving what metaphor has stolen is meant to reorient the proper scope and scale of decolonial struggle. In this essay we identify how the Mobius strip between Tuck € and Yang’s critique of metaphor and their directive for decolonization is made real through purported similitude to another field of struggle: abolition. Their charge does not just rebuff poststructuralist misdirection, it also operationalises a synecdoche that engulfs slavery by having decolonization stand in for the totality of struggle. Across their collaborative publications, their work simultaneously invokes and subsumes Black studies scholars such as Saidiya Hartman, Hortense Spillers, Sylvia Wynter, Audre Lorde, Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, bell hooks, Fred Moten, Frank B. Wilderson III, Denise Ferreira da Silva, Katherine McKittrick, Thomas Shapiro, and the Black/Land Project (see Morrill et al. 2016; Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 2013; Tuck et al. 2014a, 2014c; Tuck and Yang 2014, 2016). Through epigraphs and secondary asides that mobilise this work on anti-Blackness, Tuck and Yang gesture towards what elsewhere is referred to as a “tangled” (Tuck et al. 2014a:6) relationship between slavery and their paradigmatic analysis of settler colonialism. This relationship is most often expressed by way of a “settler-native-slave” triad, a model whose reliance on difference-in-unity nonetheless collapses difference under a presumptive totality. On the one hand, anti-Blackness is employed as a structure alongside settler colonialism, each identified through distinct logics. Each vertex of the triad appears to have equal influence. The dynamic shifts, however, when attempting to broach the relationality between vertices.1 By citing Black scholarship with little and often no elaboration, Tuck and Yang exemplify how anti-Blackness is theoretically engulfed by the settler colonial paradigm. Seen as derivative, rather than essential to the constitution of the triad, the figure of the slave is transubstantiated into either a colonised or proto-settler position. That is, under the weight of the settler-colonial structure, the equality of the triad transmutes into the hierarchy of a binary. Tuck and Yang’s political manoeuvres serve as a cautionary example of what Frank B. Wilderson calls “the ruse of analogy” (2010:35–53) as they fold slavery into settler colonialism in order to mediate the dis/similarity between the slave and native. The problem with such moves lay in the way that they position slaves within the world, imbuing them with positive substance, so as to vivify the ethical-political dilemmas of decolonization.This essay examines Tuck and Yang’s text as exemplifying a theoretical tension between sovereignty and the figure of the slave that subtends settler colonial studies, which is also to say that Tuck and Yang’s work is under consideration insofar as it is a symptom of a general problematic within the aforementioned field. Our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we identify the object Tuck and Yang want to recover from the metaphor. Next, we elaborate how this object is both sustained and undermined by metaphysical commitments that divide the material from the symbolic, space from its symbols. Lastly, we articulate how this object-orientation pulls slavery into its orbit, only to disavow and subsume it. Contrary to positions that would want to protect the essence of Blackness from appropriation by other discourses, we argue that anti-Blackness is animated by the gratuitous substitution that marks metaphoricity. We contend, in metaphysical and methodological contradistinction to Tuck and Yang, that slavery is (nothing but) metaphor.

1. McKittrick 2015 (Katherine McKittrick – Professor in Gender Studies and the Graduate Program in Cultural Studies, Black Studies, Cultural Geographies, The Arts (music, fiction, poetry, visual art), Theories of Race, and Interdisciplinarity at University of Queens. “Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as a Praxis”, Duke University Press, pp. 9-10 [starting at “This conversation should be read with Wynter’s …” to “lives of all humans are increasingly subordinated to a figure that thrives on accumulation.”] – ERW/BEH) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)